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Abstract 
As can been seen from the U.S.’s non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, together 
with the negotiations toward the post-Kyoto Protocol framework, the U.S. and China 
have been quarrelling over their responsibilities and have contradicted one another 
over the introduction of compulsory domestic greenhouse gases emission reduction 
targets. Therefore, for a long time, it has been argued that the controversy between 
the two countries has hindered the process of forging an international agreement to 
deal with climate change. On the other hand, Sino-U.S. bilateral cooperation on 
climate change has significantly increased in recent years in summit talks and their 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED), especially after the 15
th
 Conference of 
Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN 
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FCCC) in Copenhagen, one of whose aims was to facilitate positive negotiations for 
the post-Kyoto Protocol agreement. Analyzing this in the light of recent 
developments, we find that the U.S. and China have tended to address climate change 
and related issues from a pluralistic viewpoint and approach, by regarding the 
achievement of bilateral cooperation and global agreements as their common 
strategic objective. 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It has been pointed out that the U.S. and Chinese controversy over climate change 
caused serious stagnation in international negotiations and cooperation. Meanwhile, 
however, Sino-U.S. cooperation on matters relating to the environment, energy and 
climate change, has been strengthened to a significant degree in recent years, such as 
was the case with the signature on the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to 
Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (2009), and the 
establishment of the U.S.-China Working Group on Climate Change (CCWG, 2013). 
The purpose of this paper is to explain why progress in cooperation between the U.S. 
and China on climate change has been made, and the paper also indicates possible 
challenges the two countries may face. It also aims to give a view on how to interpret 
recent developments as well as provide a basis for research for future case studies.  
 
In the following sections, the paper first introduces the U.S. and China’s confrontation 
on climate change and its influence on the stagnation of international negotiations. 
Followed by the three explanatory factors that are argued for in the paper, the second 
part describes recent Sino-U.S. cooperation on climate change by analyzing how the 
two countries have begun to treat climate change as an important strategic issue that 
they hold in common. 
 
II. U.S.-China Confrontations & the Stagnation of International 
Negotiations on the Post-Kyoto Framework 
 
2 
 
Concerns over climate change were growing significantly in international society, 
alongside the publication of the Fourth & Fifth Assessment Report (AR4, 2007; AR5, 
2013) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 and 2013. 
However, the U.S.-China confrontation on climate change reached a climax during 
negotiations at the 13th Conference of Parties (COP13) of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2007 in Bali. In two years of 
dialogue after COP11 (2005), parties adopted a roadmap, entitled the Bali Action Plan 
(BAP), in Bali to conclude the prolonged negotiations for the post-Kyoto framework in 
COP15, which was scheduled to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
 
However, in the process of negotiating the Bali Action Plan, the U.S. and G77+China 
(developing countries group) quarreled over the burden-sharing between the developed 
and developing parties for a post-Kyoto regime. For example, at the last plenary 
meeting of COP13, one of the negotiators from a developing country berated the U.S. 
by saying, “If you cannot lead, leave it to the rest of us. Please get out of the way.1” 
After this happened in Bali, the BAP (Decision 1/CP.13) was finally agreed in order to 
enable negotiations on a post-Kyoto framework through the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperation Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), which was assigned 
the responsibility of completing negotiations within two years on four main topics: A 
Shared Vision, Mitigation, Adaptation, and Finance & Technology Transfers. Although 
the BAP was adopted and provided the outline of the post-Kyoto framework, there was 
no significant progress between Bali and Copenhagen. One of the main reasons for this 
                                                   
1
 “COP13--Bali Climate Conference,” Global Issue, January 1, 2008. 
<http://www.globalissues.org/article/751/cop13-bali-climate-conference>, URL assessed on June 20, 
2014. 
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was the confrontation between the U.S. and China. With a focus on obtaining an 
agreement on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction, international negotiation and 
cooperation on climate change faced huge difficulties, due to intense disputes over the 
responsibility between the developed and developing countries. 
 
After Bali and the adoption of the BAP, major parties started to initiate other 
multilateral platforms to grope for a post-Kyoto deal. For example, the U.S. President 
G.W. Bush convened a meeting called the Major Economies Meeting on Energy 
Security and Climate Change (MEM) to bring China, India and other major GHG 
emitters together to have a dialogue and exchange opinion on relevant issues, including 
clean technology transfers, energy efficiency and security. Although the strained 
relations between the U.S. and China had not completely eased by this time, the meeting 
opened a channel for them to at least sit at the same table and discuss the relevant issues. 
Soon in July 2009, the two countries signed a memorandum to enhance bilateral 
cooperation on climate change, with the intention of facilitating a global agreement in 
Copenhagen.
2
 
 
COP15 in Copenhagen ended with the drawing up of a political document titled the 
Copenhagen Accord. The Accord, which the parties as a whole only agreed to take note 
of, was a compromise by a limited number of countries against a backdrop of political 
chaos.
3
 There have been many discussions on the reasons for the failure of the 
                                                   
2
 “The U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy 
and the Environment,” the U.S. State Department, July 20, 2009. 
3
 The Copenhagen Accord was accepted in a closed-door meeting among about 30 Parties. After political 
negotiation, the Parties as a whole agreed to “take note of” the Accord, because of strong opposition from 
4 
 
conference. However, opportunities also cropped up both inside and outside the 
UNFCCC negotiations.
4
 For example, the adoption of the Cancun Agreement in 2010 
restored confidence in the UN process, and it was agreed that pivotal compromises 
needed to be made by major parties to establish the outline of any future framework. On 
the other hand, the stagnation in the UN negotiations accelerated both minilateralism,
5
 
e.g. the launch of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF), 
and bilateralism, such as the Sino-U.S. cooperation in strategic dialogues. This paper 
aims to answer why so many significant changes occurred between the U.S. and China. 
Here I argue for three factors that should be taken into consideration: (1) the estimated 
impacts and concerns caused by climate change, (2) a multi-tiered approach that was 
agreed upon among major players (states), and (3) the search for an international 
agreement. I will analyze each of them after the following section. 
 
III. Sino-U.S. Strategic Partnerships on Climate Change 
 
Notwithstanding the U.S. and China’s disagreement over the responsibility for tackling 
climate change, which was identified as the main cause of the stalemate in 
negotiations,
6
 the two countries have actually agreed to cooperate on reducing or 
                                                                                                                                                     
some developing countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela. 
4
 Harro van Asselt, 2014. 
5
 Eckersley, 2012. 
6
 Soon after the closing of COP 15, the UK climate secretary, Ed Miliband, accused China of trying to 
“hijack” the climate deal by pointing out, “We did not get an agreement on 50% reductions in global 
emissions by 2050 or on 80% reductions by developed countries. Both were vetoed by China, despite the 
support of a coalition of developed and the vast majority of developing countries” (Miliband, 2009). 
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slowing the increase of GHG emissions.
7
 Sino-U.S. cooperation on climate change in 
recent years has been expanded and intensified to a great extent.
8
 First of all, in order to 
better understand the bilateral partnerships on climate change, energy and environment 
in each country, the development of bilateral cooperation will be discussed by reviewing 
the frameworks and projects that have been implemented in recent years.  
 
Table 1: Sino-U.S. Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change 
 
Year Cooperation Cooperation Topics 
2008. 6 
 
SED 4 
Initiating TYF & EcoPartnerships 
 
(1) Energy saving of electric power 
systems and logistics 
(2) Efficiency of transportation 
(3) Water pollution 
(4) Air pollution 
(5) Forests and wetlands protection 
2009. 7  S&ED I  
Joint Press Statement of the First 
S&ED 
Signature of First Memorandum on climate 
change 
2009. 7 
 
S&ED I  
Memorandum of Understanding to 
Enhance Cooperation on Climate 
Change, Energy and the 
Environment 
10 fields in a cooperative relationship 
including: 
(1) Energy-saving 
(2) Renewable energy 
(3) Clean coal 
(4) Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
2009. 11 The U.S.-China Joint Statement 
(President Obama visits China) 
To launch or to establish:  
(1) The clean energy research center 
(2) The Electric Vehicles Initiative 
                                                   
7
 See Table 1. 
8
 Guoyi et al, 2009. 
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(3) New energy saving action plan 
(4) New renewable energy partnership 
(5) Large scale CCS project 
(6) Promotion of clean coal 
(7) New Shale Gas Initiative 
(8) The Energy Cooperation Program 
(ECP) 
2009. 11 Protocol for Cooperation on a 
Clean Energy Research Center 
Research subjects include: 
(1) Energy efficiency of buildings 
(2) Clean energy 
(3) CCS  
(4) Clean vehicles 
To support: 
(1) The Electric Vehicles Initiative 
(2) Large scale CCS project 
2009. 11 Memorandum of Cooperation to 
Build Capacity to Address Climate 
Change 
 
(1) The Establishment of The Renewable 
Energy Partnership 
(2) Support for the continuation of The 
Energy Policy Dialogue. 
2011. 1 The U.S.-China Joint Statement 
(President Hu visits the U.S.)  
・Confirmation of current dialogues and 
negotiations. 
・Support for UNFCCC, COP and the 
Cancun Agreement 
2011. 5 S&ED III  
Improvement of TYF & 
EcoPartnerships 
 
・Signature of the six new eco-partnerships 
under the TYF. 
2013. 4 
 
Joint U.S.-China Statement on 
Climate Change  
・Establishment of the U.S.-China Bilateral 
Working Group on Climate Change 
(CCWG) 
2013.6 The U.S.-China Joint Statement 
(President Xi visits the U.S.) 
・Phase down the consumption and 
production of hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) 
under the Montreal Protocol 
7 
 
2013. 7 
 
S&ED V 
The U.S.-China Joint Statement 
・Continuation of the current work of the 
CCWG  
・5 fields of cooperation were added to 
prompt GHG emission reductions 
July 
2014 
S&ED 
VI 
S&ED VI 
 
･New 8 EcoPartnerships 
･CCWG special event on the private sector 
･Policy dialogue among top negotiators 
Source: Author. References: U.S. State Department; Committee on U.S.-China Cooperation on 
Electricity from Renewable Resources et al. 2010: 205-216; U.S.-China EcoPartnership official 
website. 
 
First, the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, 
Energy and the Environment (MOU) was released in July 2009. It aimed at cooperation 
on a wide range of issues while strengthening the Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation 
on Energy and Environment (TYF), which was established in 2008 at the fourth 
Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED 4) (Table 1 & Figure 1). The TYF serves as a 
platform for the U.S. and China to cooperate through projects in fields like clean air, 
water, energy efficiency. In particular, they have signed numerous EcoPartnerships 
under the TYF to work on the goals and plans set by S&ED and MOU through practical 
projects and meet their need to address their mutual reciprocal demands (Figure 1). The 
TYF and EcoPartnerships, based on their purposes and outcomes, have grown and 
expanded into a variety of diverse fields.
9
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9
 “Six Inducted into U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Program,” the U.S. Department of State, July 10, 2014. 
8 
 
Figure 1: Structure of Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change under 
S&ED 
 
 
※ Lines refer to the linkages between the arrangements 
Source: Author. 
 
The topics for the MOU of 2009 include “(1) Energy conservation and energy 
efficiency; (2) Renewable energy; (3) Cleaner uses of coal, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS); (4) Sustainable transportation, including electric vehicles; (5) Modernization of 
the electrical grid; (6) Joint research and development of clean energy technologies; (7) 
Clean air; (8) Clean water; (9) Natural resource conservation, e.g., protection of 
wetlands and nature reserves; and (10) Combating climate change and promoting 
9 
 
low-carbon economic growth.
10” Besides, the two countries agreed to cooperate by 
establishing The Climate Change Policy Dialogue to facilitate policy cooperation on 
climate change (Table 1). 
 
On November 17, 2009, a Sino-U.S. Joint Statement was released by President Obama 
and President Hu Jintao, where new progress was achieved. First, despite its opposition 
to the definition raised in the 2007 Bali Conference, the U.S. officially accepted the 
principle agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit to tackle climate change under the United 
Nations, that is, a common but differentiated responsibility and capability. Second, 
leaders of both sides expressed their intention to take action to reduce or lower the 
intensity of GHG emissions. Furthermore, the two countries declared that they would 
promote cooperation on finance and technology transfers for adaptation and mitigation 
based on equality and mutual reciprocity. 
 
In the MOU (July 2009), the U.S. and China agreed to launch a new action plan for 
energy efficiency under the TYF. Furthermore, in order to achieve mutual goals, the 
Memorandum of Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate Change
11
 and the 
Protocol for Cooperation on a Clean Energy Research Center (CERC
12
) were also 
                                                   
10
 “Appendix: A Timeline of U.S.-Chinese Cooperation on Clean Energy and Climate Change,” The Power 
of Renewables: Opportunities and Challenges for China and the United States, 2010, p. 212. 
11 “Memorandum of Cooperation between the National Development and Reform Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States of America to 
Build Capacity to Address Climate Change” is its full title.  
12 The “Protocol between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China for 
Cooperation on a Clean Energy Research Center” is its full title. 
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signed (Figure 1). In the latter document, China and the U.S. agreed to finance CERC 
before 2015 with a minimum of 150 million US dollars each, to provide the means and 
facilitate interactions between engineers and researchers from both sides. The main 
research topics of CERC, which will be given precedence, include (1) energy efficient 
buildings, (2) clean energy (including CCS), (3) clean vehicles, and (4) clean coal 
technology. In particular, they further agreed to introduce large-scale CCS projects to 
facilitate quick action on technical development and the use, spread and transfer of 
technologies. 
 
Since 2009, China and the U.S. have been holding a periodic U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to discuss the critical issues between them. In the 
second round of S&ED in May 2010, they decided to deal with climate change-related 
issues by announcing an action plan under S&ED and TYF, and they signed an 
Implementation Plan for EcoPartnerships. Both sides agreed to hold (1) the first U.S. 
and China Energy Efficiency Forum, (2) the Electric Vehicles Forum, (3) the first 
Renewable Energy Forum, (4) an Energy Policy Dialogue, (5) the Oil and Gas Industry 
Forum, and (6) to run the Clean Energy Research Center Working Group, as well as the 
Renewable Energy Partnership (Figure 1). The partnerships aim to promote 
collaborative relationships between the public and private sectors. Also, the dialogue 
was designed to accelerate the application of clean energy by improving technologies 
and companies’ competitiveness.  
 
Looking at the agreements reached, the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship on climate 
change and energy contains a wide range of projects aimed at an ultimate goal, that is, 
11 
 
to facilitate negotiations and reach international agreements that best suit both sides’ 
interests. U.S. and Chinese leaders have been emphasizing the importance of working 
together to continue dialogues and forums with a primary aim of understanding each 
other better.
13
 Agreeing that climate change should be tackled through a balanced 
approach that combines environmental technologies and opportunities for further 
economic growth, the U.S. and China have come to consider energy efficiency and 
technological cooperation as crucial in their common interest in promoting emissions 
reduction. For instance, both sides are trying to integrate industrial and technological 
specifications and regulations, while dealing with observable climate change and its 
adverse effects through measures such as CCS and pollution abatement.  
 
In the following sections, three factors are offered as an explanation of the current 
strategic partnerships between the U.S. and China. These are (1) the impact of and 
concerns regarding climate change, (2) a multi-tiered approach to solutions, and (3) the 
pursuit of international agreements. 
 
IV. Observable and Estimated Impacts & Concerns regarding 
Climate Change  
 
National & Security Concerns in the United States 
 
Both the adverse effects of climate change within the territories (direct effects) and the 
                                                   
13
 The U.S.-China Joint Statement, July 2009, January 2011; Remarks at the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue, 2014. 
12 
 
impact caused by extreme events outside the U.S. (indirect effects) cause concerns to 
the nation’s inhabitants and its policy makers.14 The U.S. presidential administration 
had difficulties in persuading Congress to adopt the Kyoto Protocol because the harmful 
effect of climate change was not obvious at the time, and the administration, as well as 
Congress, gave priority to risks such as the loss of employment and the impact on 
domestic economic growth and international competitiveness. Since then, bills that 
contain international and legally binding targets or commitments to reduce emissions 
have faced difficulties in Congress. 
 
In recent years, however, arguments regarding the impact of climate change from a 
national security perspective have become substantial, both practically and 
theoretically.
15
 Meanwhile, support for climate-related bills among the senators has 
substantially expanded, when compared to 1997 when the administration considered the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The Bush administration, despite its opposition to the 
protocol, shifted to an active position in dealing with the issue. For instance, President 
George W. Bush’s State of the Union address on January 23, 2007 marked a U.S. 
president’s first recognition of global climate change as “a serious challenge.16” Besides, 
the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued a confidential report entitled “National 
Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate 
Change to 2030” in June 2008, and concluded that the effects of climate change in 
twenty years would be extensive although indirect, and adverse effects in other 
                                                   
14
 Moran, 2011: 148. 
15
 Busby, 2008; Barnett and Adger, 2007. 
16
 G.W. Bush, 2007. 
13 
 
countries may also affect the national security of the U.S.
17
 
 
Disputes over resources such as water may cause conflicts that disturb the regional 
order. This can be understood as a “threat multiplier” or an “amplifier” on already poor 
social and political conditions in potential collision.
18
 Once the U.S. is involved in the 
conflict, its allies might request military intervention or humanitarian assistance in the 
area of conflict, and this may lead to regional or international tensions. Additionally, if 
weather conditions deteriorate seriously, a large flow of environmental refugees might 
be generated, being forced to move across borders. In that case, the report contended, 
the U.S.’s social stability would be threatened significantly if they had to host such a 
large number of refugees from South America.
19
 
 
Also, Busby pointed out that the possible impact of climate change on U.S. homeland 
security includes (1) abrupt climate change, (2) rising sea levels, (3) extreme weather 
events and (4) Arctic sea ice melt.
20
 In particular, abrupt climate change and rising sea 
levels are seen as a long-term challenge, although hardly regarded as immediate threats 
to U.S. homeland security. However, there are cases of extreme weather events, such as 
Hurricane Katrina, which struck the southeastern U.S. in 2005 and caused catastrophic 
destruction to the majority of New Orleans. Katrina killed over 1,800 people, and the 
damage to oil infrastructure and facilities amounted to more than $800 billion. In 
addition, more than 270,000 citizens were transported to shelters away from their 
                                                   
17
 National Intelligence Council, 2008. 
18
 White, 2011:78. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Busby, 2008: 468-504. 
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hometowns. Apart from Katrina, we have also been witnessing the frequent occurrence 
of giant hurricanes coinciding with tornados in recent years. 
 
So far, scientists still find it difficult to attribute the occurrence of extreme weather 
events to the progression of climate change. The occurrence of Hurricane Katrina, 
however, made the U.S. people and policy makers realized how a devastating disaster 
can damage homeland security. Discussions regarding the relationship between 
hurricane strength and global warming were activated after Katrina, while concerns 
about and interest in addressing climate change increased notably.
21
 Last but not least, 
the shrinking of Arctic sea ice has raised arguments among neighboring countries, such 
as Canada, Norway and Russia, over the right to traditional and new sea routes, as well 
as the right to develop resources. Obviously, the melting of Arctic sea ice is directly 
linked to the crucial interests of U.S. national and military security.
22
 
 
Besides U.S. concerns for homeland security, climate change may also present security 
challenges by affecting U.S. national interests overseas. Busby listed examples such as 
(1) damaged overseas assets or U.S. military bases, (2) loss of overseas facilities and 
infrastructure, (3) the flow of environmental refugees and regional instability, and (4) 
the emergence of failed states and large humanitarian disasters.
23
 Busby’s argument 
indicates that traditional security issues, such as conflicts or regional instability, can be 
directly caused by environmental degradation. Both U.S. national and extraterritorial 
security interests may be influenced by extreme weather events or natural disasters. 
                                                   
21
 Ibid, 484. 
22
 Ibid, 489-490. 
23
 Ibid, 498. 
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Environmental Degradation and Social Concerns in China  
 
In China, there are two kinds of concerns caused by climate change and global 
warming. The first one is related to its territory, such as arises from flooded homelands, 
a reduced territory along the coast and the erosion of coastal areas from sea level rises 
which could create huge economic losses in more developed areas. The submergence of 
islands may change the maritime border of China and its neighboring countries, which 
could significantly impact China’s security interests.24 
 
The second concern is a decline in the quality of soil. This can be understood from the 
expanding desertification in the northern and western areas of China. Since the 1950s 
until the end of the 1990s, desertification in northern China has shown a tendency to 
expand.
25
 In addition, the progress of the desertification in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
etc. has become obvious due to water shortages and an excessive use of land.
26
 The 
area of desertification in the region reached 318,600 square kilometers, accounting for 
3.32% of the total territory.
27
 It is important to note that desertification not only causes 
the disappearance of residential and agricultural land, it also, and at the same time, 
increases the strength and frequency of sandstorms. One example is the problem of 
                                                   
24
 Zhang, 2010: 61-81. 
25
 The current area of desertification is 1.2 to 1.3 times larger than it was between the mid-50s and 
mid-70s, Zhang, 2010: 83. 
26
 “Obvious” means that the quality of the soil is at a stage between desertification and 
non-desertification. This type of land, even though not yet sandy, clearly shows a tendency towards 
desertification, China State Forestry Administration, 2005. 
27
 Ibid. 
16 
 
desertification in Wuwei City, Minqin County (Gansu Province). This is an example that 
is widely accepted as being an adverse effect of progressive climate change.
28
  
 
The Chinese government has released several official documents to clarify its position 
and national policies after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. It presents its concerns 
about the aggravation of the problem and the possible social and economic effects of 
environmental degradation in China. The Chinese government has been emphasizing 
that, regarding climate change, as a matter of social and economic development, it is 
developed countries who should take the responsibility in addressing the issue. 
However, at the same time, it recognizes that climate change is a threat to the 
preservation of resources, agricultural development and the natural environment.
29
 In 
the last few decades, China, while insisting that industrialized countries should take 
responsibility in dealing with the degradation, has been asking for the right to make 
domestic development its first priority.
30
 On the other hand, China has been facing 
domestic problems from environmental degradation and has suffered huge economic 
and social costs as a result of its excessive emphasis on economic growth. In its 2007 
national report, China showed its intention to adopt climate change policies as a result 
                                                   
28
 Minqin County, which is located downstream of the Shiyang River Basin, is the only water resource in 
the county. The precipitation in Minqin has been increasing because of rising temperatures. However, 
evaporation reaches up to 24 times the level of precipitation, reducing water levels upstream, and 
significantly reducing the amount of available water resources in areas downstream and midstream. 
Ecological degradation in the Shiyang River Basin makes the subject of desertification in the Minqin area 
more serious than ever. The lack of water resources and the deterioration of the quality of life have forced 
26,500 residents to move out in the last decade. Source: Dai et al., 2008: 322. 
29
 “Chapter 3: Influence and Challenge of Climate Change in China,” China's National Program against 
Climate Change, Chinese State Council, 2007. 
30
 Smith and Lennon, 2008. 
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of expected adverse effects on its economic and social development programs. The 
government indicated climate change as “a serious challenge to its modality of current 
social and economic development, energy structure, the capability of independent 
development of energy technology, the protection and use of forest resources, the 
agricultural adaptation of climate, the protection and development of water resources, as 
well as its ability to respond to threats due to sea level rises.
31”  
 
The 2007 report also indicates that “observed changes in temperature are consistent 
with a global scale, thus appropriate domestic measures are urgently necessary.
32” In 
fact, China’s position on climate change began to lay emphasis on the phenomenon of 
climate change, especially global warming, which has had adverse effects in various 
areas in China, for instance, desertification, drought, and floods.
33
 It can be seen at 
present that China is responding to the issue more actively by implementing climate 
policy at both the local and central government levels. Certainly, there are still huge 
challenges for the authorities as they try to strike a balance between environmental 
protection, a high level of economic growth, and political stability. 
 
Besides its environmental and social concerns about climate change, energy security 
became another serious challenge for China. Since 1993, China has become a net 
importer of petroleum. Domestic oil production in China nowadays only meets half of 
its demand.
34
 Also, China became a net importer of natural gas in 2008. There was 
                                                   
31
 Ibid. 
32
 China's National Program against Climate Change, 2007. 
33
 Ibid, 2007: 4-5. 
34
 The People’s Daily, 2010. 
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already a gap between domestic production and consumption in 2009 of four billion 
square meters of natural gas.
35
 With the shortage in domestic production and the need 
to rely on foreign oil and natural gas, expanding the use of renewable energy became an 
important objective. This is also a rational choice for China in dealing with climate 
change and its adverse effects as it seeks to complement its domestic demand for fossil 
fuels.  
 
V. Multi-Tiered Approach on Solutions to Climate Change  
 
As analyzed above, climate change can have an impact on the environment, society 
and even security in both the U.S. and China. Policy makers are convinced about the 
value of a combination of various methods and tools, termed a multi-tiered approach 
here, to deal with the problems and possible impacts.
36
 This multi-tiered approach 
contains two dimensions, including adaptation and mitigation, that take financial and 
technological support, and capacity building as its basis. These have been accepted, 
after the adoption of the Bali Action Plan, as solutions for use under conditions of 
international cooperation. Because of the complexity of the problem, there have been 
difficulties in reaching a comprehensive global agreement to overcome the problem of 
uncertainty since climate change is caused by both anthropogenic and natural factors.
37
 
After more than two decades of negotiation, as climate change appeared to be getting 
worse, policy makers began to consider the necessity of mobilizing dynamic policy 
                                                   
35
 International Energy Agency, 2009. 
36
 AR5: SPM, IPCC, 2013. 
37
 See IPCC 2007 Table SPM.2: “Recent trends, assessment of human influence on the trend and 
projections for extreme weather events for which there is an observed late-20th century trend.” 
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instruments by using various methods. At present, a multi-tiered approach seems to 
have replaced past negotiations that only focused on absolute GHG emission reductions 
to mitigate climate change.  
 
Table 2: Multi-Tiered Approach to Tackling Climate Change 
Approaches 
Adaptation Mitigation 
Objectives 
・Responses to environmental degradation 
・Reducing damage due to adverse effects 
Measures 
・Inputs of tools and resources  
・e.g. Construction, infrastructure, removal 
of GHG emissions, etc. 
Objectives 
・Prevent or moderate degradation  
・Managing potential risk of environmental 
destruction 
Measures 
・Conversion of tools and systems  
・e.g. Innovations, revolutions in 
technology, etc. 
Supported by financial, technological assistance and capacity building 
Source: Author. 
 
Climate change, according to existing scientific knowledge, is occurring due to human 
economic activities as well as spontaneous atmospheric variation in the weather, so that 
states are able to respond on two dimensions when addressing climate change. The first 
is an exogenous approach, which is presently perceived as adaptation. In this approach, 
tools and resources are introduced. For instance, breakwaters are constructed or 
facilities for keeping water are strengthened in order to resist the damage brought about 
by natural disasters and extreme weather events (Table 2). Adaptation aims to reduce 
ecological vulnerability and to respond to adverse effects in a specific country or region. 
The inputs of tools and resources include equipment, human resources, financial support 
and existing technologies. Adaptation is considered necessary, since environmental 
20 
 
degradation, such as a further rise in temperature and rising sea levels are predicted to 
be inevitable.
38
 Because of the nature of climate change, states could not agree on 
solutions to setting GHG emissions reduction targets for the major emitters.
39
 Still, 
Parties have been paying no less attention to adaptation than to mitigation, and they are 
making concrete progress in post-Kyoto negotiations. 
 
In contrast to adaptation, the concentration of GHGs has been rising in the atmosphere 
and has led to ongoing global warming and climate change since the Industrial 
Revolutions. Another approach in addressing climate change is to reduce anthropogenic 
GHG emissions (e.g. reductions in absolute emissions or emission intensity.) The 
implement of endogenous approaches, understood as mitigation in current negotiations 
and agreements, enables human activities to contribute to the prevention of worsening 
climate change. It should be noted here that mitigation may not eliminate climate 
change, but it can to some extent prevent the problem from getting worse. 
 
To reduce GHG emissions or their intensity, mitigation requires a conversion of tools 
as well as systems (Table 2). Conversion refers to the implementation of innovative 
technology and systems in search of economic development and technological 
improvement. By innovation, for example, the creation of new processes, measures or 
devices can enable a consumption of resources to be more efficient, energy-saving and 
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 See IPCC 2007 Table SPM.3: “Projected global average surface warming and sea level rise at the end 
of the 21st century.” 
39
 For enhancing adaptation actions, Annex 1 Parties (developed countries) have committed to offer 
financial support to developing countries, especially those vulnerable to climate change, under the Green 
Climate Fund, which was adopted at the Sixteenth Conference of Parties (COP16) of UNFCCC in 
Cancun. 
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environmentally-friendly.
40
 Negotiations with a focus on mitigation, such as the 
pledged targets for GHG emissions reduction as well as on the technology transfers 
between developing and developed states have retained their importance both in the UN 
and in other multilateral and bilateral negotiations.  
 
After the adoption of BAP, adaptation and mitigation, supported by financial and 
technological assistance and capacity building, are currently considered to be a 
multi-tiered approach to the problem of dealing with climate change. The Copenhagen 
Accord, the Cancun Agreement and the Durban Platform adopted by UNFCCC have 
confirmed these approaches as suitable for addressing the issue under a future 
framework. Although the full package deal is still under negotiation, the U.S. and China 
have initiated cooperation through dialogues and projects in a multi-tiered manner. In 
the following section, the third factor involved in this quickly growing Sino-U.S. 
cooperation, that is, the pursuit of bilateral reconciliation and further international 
agreements, will be analyzed by looking at recent political dialogues and initiatives.  
 
VI. Pursuit of International Agreements  
 
Before the opening of COP15 in 2009, it could be seen that the two countries had 
started to open up channels for bilateral dialogues, and to initiate climate-related 
programs and projects through efforts in both the public and private sectors. The U.S. 
                                                   
40
 To be specific, conversions of tools and systems in coping with climate change can be related to the 
concept of ecological modernization, which shows that the development and creation of new 
environmental technologies can provoke new employment and economic benefits. See Wurzel and 
Connelly, 2010. 
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and China have shown particularly positive positions and intentions in dealing with 
climate issues, even though they have not fully eliminated their mutually conflicting 
interests. On the recent U.S. and China strategic partnerships, bilateral cooperation 
might have influenced the international rule-making process, since the two countries are 
the world’s top two GHG emitters, although disagreements between the U.S. and China 
have been considered a significant factor behind the long period of non-agreement. 
 
Undoubtedly, the motivations for the U.S. and China to alter their negotiating positions 
and climate policies derive from their own interests. On the background of possible 
impacts, concerns about climate change and the implications of a multi-tiered approach, 
the U.S. and China shifted their positions to cooperate by establishing partnerships, 
forums and dialogues. It is to be understood that both countries have tended to treat 
climate change as a strategic issue that affects their vital interests. That is, they began to 
have clearer national interests by facilitating collaboration by, for instance, developing 
benign and mutually reciprocal bilateral relations in order to solve energy and climate 
change issues. In particular, the establishment of their leading positions in negotiating a 
future framework is one of the most important aims of their partnership. This point will 
be discussed in the following section. 
 
Purposes of the U.S.-China Strategic Partnership on Climate Change 
 
This section analyzes the purposes of Sino-U.S. cooperation on climate change. First 
of all, one of the most important objectives of the Obama administration has been to 
reach an alternative and practical agreement while maintaining its satisfactory relations 
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with China. Soon after his inauguration, President Obama explicitly emphasized the 
impact of climate change and indicated that it is an urgent issue with regard to security, 
which must be dealt with in a serious way.
41
 Obama again emphasized climate change 
as a new challenge to national and global security in the National Security Strategy 
2010 by pointing out that climate change has not been managed efficiently due to 
shortcomings in existing international institutions. He stated, “…we must focus 
American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the 
collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent 
extremism…and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change…42” Also, 
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which was published in 
2010 for the first time, described climate change as a new challenge by noting “new 
actors, good and bad, have the power to shape international affairs like never before. 
The challenges we face--nuclear proliferation, global pandemics, climate change, 
terrorism--are more complex than ever.
43” The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
delivered a speech before attending the 5
th
 East Asia Summit to emphasize the common 
strategic interests between the U.S. and China on global issues. She stated, “The two 
countries share the responsibility of constructing an obvious strategy in addressing 
climate change.
44” Furthermore, a chapter related to climate change was included for the 
first time in the U.S. Defense Department Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (QDR). It 
pointed to climate change and energy as key issues that will play significant roles in 
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 Holland, 2008. 
42
 U.S. White House, 2010: 3. 
43
 U.S. Department of State / USAID, 2010. 
44
 Clinton, 2010. 
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shaping the country’s future security environment.45 
 
Another aim relates to economic perspectives (e.g. industry, the market, employment). 
Some have argued that the Obama administration tends to expand its rights and interests 
by integrating standards and regulations with China on environmental technologies.
46
 
For China, it is also an urgent task to solve domestic environmental degradation and 
energy resource issues by introducing efficient technologies and systems, while 
maintaining economic growth. Under Sino-U.S. S&ED, as we can see from Table 1, 
technological development, such as CCS, clean/renewable energy, electric vehicles, 
covers a large proportion of the current environmental and energy cooperation.  
 
Table 3: Focus Areas under the U.S.-China S&ED, TYF & EcoPartnerships  
Adaptation Mitigation 
 
 
Focus 
Areas 
・Carbon capture & storage (CCS)  
・Clean water  
・Clean air  
・Natural resource conservation 
・Clean energy  
・Electric vehicles  
・Renewable energy  
・Energy conservation and energy 
efficiency 
・Emission/consumption reductions 
in GHGs (HFCs) 
・Financial assistance 
・Technological assistance 
・Capacity building (e.g. Accurate & reliable GHG data collection & analysis) 
※Measures agreed between the U.S. and China are included but not limited to those listed in the 
table. 
Source: Author. 
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 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010. 
46
 Sasaki, 2011: 10. 
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The subject of climate change was again taken up in a Joint Statement at the Sino-U.S. 
Summit in January 2011 when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the U.S. They agreed 
to support the Clean Energy Research Center, the Renewable Energy Partnership, the 
Joint Statement of Cooperation on Energy Security, TYF, and the Cancun Agreement. 
Meanwhile, they agreed to continue to negotiate under the UNFCCC.
47
 Later on, 
climate change, environmental protection and energy security were again central topics 
at the 3
rd
 S&ED (May 2011). There, the U.S. and China further expanded their 
cooperation by signing six new EcoPartnerships under the TYF (Table 1).
48
 The 
EcoPartnership currently contains seven focus areas, including clean air, clean water 
and energy efficiency. These can be regarded as practice for both adaptation and 
mitigation with mutual support being provided on financial assistance, technology 
transfers and capacity building (Figure 1 & Table 3).  
 
In addition to new EcoPartnerships, the U.S. and China confirmed that one of the 
urgent tasks required for adapting to climate change is to strengthen the capacity of 
recording/projecting Chinese GHG emissions accurately. Based on the Memorandum of 
Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate Change, the U.S. National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration and the Chinese Meteorological Administration agreed 
to strengthen common research in order to improve China’s ability to observe and 
analyze data (Figure 1 & Table 3).
49
 Sure enough, capacity building, which has been 
considered fundamental for the effective implementation of adaptation and mitigation, 
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2011. 
48
 “Remarks at U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Signing Ceremony,” U.S. Department of State, Washington 
D.C., May 10, 2011. 
49
 U.S. Department of State, 2011. 
26 
 
aims to improve public awareness, participation and access to knowledge and 
information by providing financial and technological assistance.
50
 
 
Recently, Sino-U.S. strategic partnerships are focusing on the Bilateral Working Group 
on Climate Change (CCWG), which was set up in 2013, and on a joint effort to 
phase-out the emission and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (Table 1 & 
Figure 1). This is the first time that the U.S. and China have cooperated on GHG 
emission cuts, and both of them have confirmed that they will continue their efforts at 
the latest S&ED VI in 2014. The CCWG aims to intensify this cooperative relationship 
by playing a role in facilitating enhanced policy dialogue among major policy makers 
and stakeholders. The working group issued its first report to S&ED 5 in July, 2013, 
with suggestions for launching new action plans for future cooperation.
51
 At S&ED VI, 
the U.S. and China signed eight new EcoPartnerships, including on industrial boilers 
and forests, to further strengthen the CCWG framework. Both sides agreed to work 
together in order to reach a global agreement by COP 21, which is scheduled to be held 
in Paris in 2015.
52
 
 
Although international negotiations had been in deadlock for decades, U.S.-Chinese 
bilateral cooperation was triggered when the effects of climate change were observed 
and estimated to be serious beyond each country’s borders. Climate change, as an 
issue-complex, can be partially mitigated by approaches such as technological 
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 Decision 15/CP.18, “Doha work program on Article 6 of the Convention,” FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2, 
February 28, 2013.  
51
 Report of the CCWG to the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. Department of State, 2013. 
52
 Stern, 2014. 
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innovation and improvements in energy efficiency, while its adverse effects can only be 
addressed by enhancing adaptation. Certainly, both energy-related technology transfers 
and information exchange serve U.S. and Chinese interests. The objective of searching 
for a strategic foundation to break through the stagnation in international negotiations 
while meeting these purposes remains crucial for the two countries.  
 
As has been shown above, U.S.-Chinese bilateral cooperation on climate change has 
been boosted to a significant level by initiating dialogues and various programs in 
recent years. Nevertheless, certain concerns exist. One that can be raised here is that the 
strategic partnerships are not compulsory. In other words, they are not legally binding. 
They are mainly based on initiatives, forums, dialogues and projects that can be 
negatively influenced by political confrontation or other exogenous factors. The other 
concern is the difficulties involved in clarifying the effectiveness and problems of each 
individual country as well as the entire partnership due to the lack of a comprehensive 
review and assessment mechanism. 
 
VII. Conclusion and Prospects 
 
Sino-U.S. relations on climate change have been discussed mostly with respect to the 
rivalry between these two major powers and their reluctance to contribute to 
international cooperation. This paper, in contrast, argues that a cooperative 
relationship/partnerships have been established in recent years, by promoting 
cooperation on related issues on the basis of each country’s strategic position. Three 
reasons are analyzed in the paper: (1) Actual and projected concerns and the effects of 
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climate change, (2) An agreed multi-tiered approach, and (3) The pursuit of a 
breakthrough in international negotiations. The U.S. and China began to take the 
various effects and risks of climate change seriously, and to tackle the issue by 
facilitating adaptation and mitigation with mutual financial, technological and 
capacity-building support. 
 
 In the background, China has been achieving rapid economic growth while 
experiencing environmental degradation such as soil, water and air pollution. For the 
U.S., on the other hand, its economic problems, like unemployment and economic 
stagnation, need more work. Under these circumstances, solutions to climate change 
provide opportunities for the two countries to cooperate on research, transfers and the 
spread of environmental and energy-related technologies, which may relieve both 
countries of their excessive dependence on fossil fuels in the coming decades.  
 
The U.S. and China have enhanced mutually beneficial relations in many issue-areas 
by initiating a range of projects on renewables, clean energy, electric vehicles and CCS, 
clean water, clean air, to mitigate against and adapt to climate change. The strategic 
partnerships have been seen as channels to present the possibility of achieving mutual 
sustainable development without causing significant confrontations and contradictions 
within each country. Climate change has been adopted as an adequate theme in 
constructing a bilateral cooperative relationship. Through dialogues and implementation, 
the cooperation on energy and environmentally related issues has begun to play an 
important part in their strategic partnership, nor are the two countries’ interests limited 
to finding solutions only to climate change. 
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Last but not least, it is important to continuously observe the implementation and 
influence of Sino-U.S. strategic partnerships. Although the partnerships on energy and 
climate change have been established in a strategic manner, this demands assessment, 
review and modification in order to be maintained and improved. In particular, the 
partnerships may be considerably influenced by extrinsic factors (e.g. security, political, 
and economic events). In view of the need to achieve post-Kyoto and a future 
framework for international cooperation, the U.S. and China certainly play critical roles 
in the negotiations for the 2015 climate pact. Therefore, strategic partnerships between 
the U.S. and China deserve further study and analysis in the years to come. 
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